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I. INTRODUCTION
When film production costs in California skyrocketed in the 1990s,
states began creating tax-incentive programs to attract film industry
production. Currently, thirty-seven states have some type of movieproduction incentives for production of television, video, and film, and
twenty-two states or U.S. territories offer film tax credits. 1 As of August
2015, more than seventy percent of motion picture production is outside
of California in states such as Georgia, Louisiana, and New York. 2
The recently released movie Divergent, based on a science fiction
book trilogy that takes place in a future post-apocalypse Chicago, cost
$85 million to create, $30 million of which was spent in Illinois.3 The
film’s producers promised to produce 1,000 jobs, and in return received
over $5 million in Illinois film tax credits. Did the reduction of tax
revenue collected by the state of Illinois result in net economic growth? 4
States have limited resources and cannot afford costly multimillion-dollar tax-incentive programs for the film industry that do not
produce the promised results. Though several academic articles have
examined international incentives that encourage the filming of U.S.
movies and television shows outside of the U.S., relatively few articles
discuss the problems caused by states competing among each other for
domestic film production. 5
1. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, STATE FILM PRODUCTION INCENTIVES & PROGRAMS
(2016); See also infra Appendix A (providing a table listing each state’s current incentive program
with state statute reference) (the term “film” refers to the activity associated with the production of
motion pictures, television programs, commercials, and other related activities).
2. See Infra Section I.D.
3. See Press Release, Office of Governor Pat Quinn, Governor Quinn Announces Summit
Entertainment’s
“Divergent”
Set
to
Film
in
Illinois
(Jan.
14,
2013),
https://www.illinois.gov/dceo/whyillinois/Film/Media/PressReleases/01.14.13_pressrelease.pdf;
Ruth L. Ratny, $40mm sci-fi “Divergent” starts filming here in April, REEL CHICAGO (Jan 08,
2013), http://www.reelchicago.com/article/40mm-sci-fi-divergent-starts-filming-here-april130108.
4. Infra Section II.B(1) (The answer is discussed.).
5. See Adrian McDonald, Down the Rabbit Hole: The Madness of State Film Incentives as a
“Solution” to Runaway Production, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 85 (Fall 2011) (advocating a national film
incentive modeled after existing California and New York incentive programs to end the
competition among states and to prevent American film production from going to foreign countries,
based on economic rationale); Eric Homsi, Financing Films One State At A Time: A Survey of
Successful Film Incentive Programs, 21 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 49 (reviewing film
incentive programs in California, New York, and New Mexico); Claire Wright, Hollywood’s
Disappearing Act: International Trade Remedies to Bring Hollywood Home, 39 AKRON L. REV.
739 (2006) (discussing whether subsidies provided by foreign countries for their domestic film
industry could be challenged under the World Trade Organization Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures); Paul Battista, “Runaway” Film and Television Production: Carrots,
Sticks, & International Tax Reform, 36 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 243 (suggesting changes to
the U.S. tax system to make foreign government tax incentives that entice U.S. taxpayer investment
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This Article examines the effectiveness of state tax incentives for
the film industry and proposes solutions for more effective and efficient
use of state tax revenue to promote economic development. It argues that
many states are wasting tax revenue on tax incentives to the film
industry that do not result in net economic growth. Part II of the Article
describes the current types of state tax incentives; California’s initial
dominance of U.S. film production; a brief overview of foreign and U.S.
film-production incentives; and the expansion of the use of tax
incentives outside of California. Part III examines the issues by
measuring the effectiveness of the state tax incentives for the film
industry; describes examples of programs that failed to produce net
economic growth; and discusses current trends in state programs. Part IV
proposes a framework for economically effective state tax-incentive
programs for the film industry: (1) require states to reexamine the need
for film industry incentive programs; (2) institute limits on incentives
awarded with annual caps or funding tied directly to state budget
appropriation; and (3) create more accountability of performance of film
industry production companies.
II. OVERVIEW OF FILM INDUSTRY STATE TAX INCENTIVES
This section will provide an overview of state tax incentives
provided to the film industry. First, it will describe the different types of
state tax incentives. It will then analyze California’s initial dominance in
using incentive programs. After discussing the movement of U.S. film
production outside of the U.S., this section will then conclude by
exploring the development of state tax incentives in states other than
California.
A.

Types of State Incentives

State film incentives vary and include income tax credits, cash
rebates, grants, sales and use tax credits or exemptions, and other
incentives that reduce the cost of doing business. In a January 2010
special report by Tax Foundation, an independent nonprofit, nonpartisan
tax-research group, each type of state film industry incentive was
reviewed. 6 The table below summarizes the state film industry
incentives typically used by states, as reviewed in the Tax Foundation

of film production in foreign countries more equitable).
6. William Luther, Movie Production Incentives: Blockbuster Support for Lackluster Policy,
TAX FOUND. (January 2010), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/sr173.pdf.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 2

428

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:425

report. 7
Table 1
Income Tax Credit

Cash Rebate
State Grant
Sales & Use Tax
Exemption
Lodging Exemption
Other tax incentives

Dollar for dollar reduction of income tax liability for
expenditures for qualified film production expense,
hiring of labor, or investment in local infrastructure
State reimbursed for portion of qualified expense
State funds offered for qualified expense
Exemption from state sales tax of qualified expenditures
Lodging reimbursement for film production cast and
crew for hotel stays of at least 30 days

Exemption, credit or deferral (abatement) of
excise taxes, inventory taxes, and other state or
local taxes or fees

Tax credits are the most prevalent state film incentive, with twentytwo of the thirty-seven states that provide some type of film-production
incentives offering tax credits. 8 These credits are generally based on a
statutorily created percentage of qualified film and television expenses.9
The definition of “qualified expenses” differs by state. 10 However, most
states include in their definition expenses identified as “above-the-line”
expenses, which are wages paid and fees associated with the director,
writers, and leading actors. 11 Some states include the so-called “belowthe-line” expenses, which include other film production costs including
wages for crew, production staff, and non-leading cast members. 12 Most
state tax credits are transferable or refundable, which allows film
production companies to sell their credits to third parties. States realize
that many film production companies would not have enough state tax
liability to be offset by that tax credit, thus making much of the tax
credit worthless. This Article will collectively refer to all state film
industry incentives as state tax incentives for the film industry.

7.
8.
9.

See generally id.
See infra Section II.D.
See MAC TAYLOR, FILM AND TELEVISION PRODUCTION: OVERVIEW OF MOTION PICTURE
INDUSTRY AND STATE TAX CREDITS 19 (2014).
10. Id. at 18.
11. Id. at 15.
12. N.Y. TAX LAW § 24(b)(2) (McKinney 2016) (the state of New York includes “below the
line” expenses in its definition of qualified production costs).
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Earlier California Dominance

California became a key state in the development of the U.S. film
industry in the early twentieth century. 13 California’s dominance in film
production in the U.S. was primarily due to the availability of
inexpensive educated labor, low-cost studio and production sites, and, of
course, its moderate weather. 14 Beginning in 1910, and through present
day, the primary area of California for film production has been the Los
Angeles area—”Hollywood.” 15 During its zenith of film production in
the mid-1990s, specifically 1997, California was responsible for 637 of
823 film production starts—over seventy-seven percent of film
production starts in the U.S. 16 Also in 1997, sixteen of the top twentyfive films were made in California. 17 For the years 1995 through 1999,
the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis measured California’s percentage
of the U.S. film industry as ranging from 51% to 55% and its gross
economic activity between $12 billion and $16 billion. 18
Table 2
Size of California Share of U.S. Film Industry
(Billions of Dollars)

CA Films
U.S. Films
CA % of US Films

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

$12
$22
52%

$13
$25
53%

$15
$26
55%

$16
$29
54%

$16
$30
54%

The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), a trade
13. See Gerben Bakker, The Economic History of the International Film Industry, EH.NET
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Feb. 10, 2008), http://eh.net/encyclopedia/the-economic-history-of-theinternational-film-industry/ (discussing the origins of the U.S. film industry).
14. Id. at 8 (California offered lower cost of distribution of films compared to other locations
in North America and Europe); See Alexandra Gil, Breaking the Studios: Antitrust and the Motion
Picture Industry, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 83, 88-89 (2008) (California also provided geographical
distance from the antitrust and patent claims of northeastern film production companies); GENE
FERNETT, AMERICAN FILM STUDIOS: AN HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (2001) (providing detail on
the history of U.S. film production and the development of film studios and film production
companies).
15. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 10.
16. MARTHA JONES, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION IN CALIFORNIA 2 (2002), available at
http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/02/01/02-001.pdf (Table 9 provides the comparison of feature film
production starts from 1994-1997).
17. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 13-14 (Figure 6, the top 25 films produced is based on the
estimated worldwide box office revenues).
18. Id. at 10 (Table 1).
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association representing six major Hollywood film production
companies, also provides statistics for that period in its 1998 report
called the “State of the Industry” (the “1998 Report”).19 The 1998
Report measured California’s share of the U.S. film industry at over
eighty percent and a gross economic activity over $27.5 billion,
significantly higher than the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
calculations. 20
C.

U.S. Film Production Outside of the U.S.
1. Growth of Runaway Production

Regardless of which statistics more accurately represented
California’s dominance of the U.S. film industry in the 1990s, the U.S.
film industry became an attractive industry to foreign countries. 21 The
concept of developing ideas for film production in the U.S. but filming
outside of the U.S., known as “runaway production,” was not a new
phenomenon in 1990. 22 However, runaway production increased
substantially in the 1990s primarily for economic reasons. 23 In the
1990s, lower production costs and government incentives made
countries such as Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom more
attractive for film production. 24 Production costs were lower in
Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom due to the decline of their
currency exchange rate from fifteen percent to twenty-three percent
compared to the U.S. dollar. 25 Most notably, Australia and Canada
provided tax credits that helped reduce production cost savings by ten
percent. 26 Canada’s tax-credit program, the more comprehensive of the
two countries, was the Film or Video Production Services Tax Credit of
1997 (CPTC). 27 CPTC offered a twenty-five percent refundable tax

19. Id. at 8.
20. Id.
21. Although this Article does not focus on issues created by the production of film and
television outside of the U.S., it makes sense to provide a cursory overview of foreign incentive
programs.
22. See Jones, supra note 16, at 35; see also MONITOR COMPANY, U.S. RUNAWAY FILM AND
TELEVISION STUDY REPORT 2 (Director’s Guild of America/Screen Actors Guild 1999).
23. MONITOR, supra note 22, at 4; Adrian McDonald, Through the Looking Glass: Runaway
Productions and “Hollywood Economics,” 9 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 879 (Summer 2007) (besides
economic rationale, runaway production may also be based artistic rationale such as the location).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. c. 1 (5th Supp.) (1985) (Can.).
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credit on qualified production costs. In addition to the CPTC, Canadian
provincial tax credits were available, collectively providing tax credits of
nearly fifty percent. 28 From 1990 to 1998, Canada’s share of the total
U.S. runaway productions (based on economics) grew from sixty-three
percent in 1990 to eighty-one percent in 1998. 29
Facing increasing runaway production internationally, the U.S. film
industry, represented primarily by the MPAA, lobbied Congress for
federal tax incentives to combat this issue. 30 Congress responded with
the passage of the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 (the “Act”). 31
The Act provided the U.S. film industry with the following federal tax
treatment: qualifying domestic film production for the manufacturing
deduction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 199; immediate write-off of domestic
film production expenditures pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 181; and favorable
depreciation treatment of certain film production expenditures pursuant
to 26 U.S.C. § 167. 32
2. Current Runaway Trends
The passage of the Act in 2004 appears to have curbed runaway
production. A 2013 study conducted by the research division of
FilmL.A., Inc., a not-for-profit California regional film organization,
found that forty-five percent of 108 major-studio productions released
into theaters that year were primarily filmed in foreign countries.33
FilmL.A.’s unique study tracks movies released within a year and
determines where they were primarily filmed. 34 Their study used a
methodology that focused on live-action and animated movies released
28. Id.; see KPMG, FILM FINANCING AND TELEVISION PROGRAMING: A TAXATION GUIDE
80 (6th Ed. 2012) (providing a comprehensive description of the current CPTC and provincial tax
credit programs); see also Marsha Henry, Canada’s Federal and Provincial Film and Television Tax
Incentives: Are They Worthwhile, and Can They be Improved (unpublished paper, Master of
Taxation program, University of Waterloo) (marshahenry.blogs.com) (providing a detailed review
of Canada’s tax credit system for film production). The current administration and procedures of the
tax credit are available at the Canada Revenue Agency website, http://www.craarc.gc.ca/tx/nnrsdnts/flm/ftc-cip/menu-eng.html.
29. See MONITOR, supra note 22, at 9 (information from Exhibit 6 graph and chart).
30. Homsi, supra note 5, at 151.
31. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357 (2004).
32. Homsi, supra note 5, at 151-156 (providing a detail analysis of the changes in federal tax
treat for the film industry due to the American Job Creation Act of 2004 and amendments).
33. ADRIAN MCDONALD, 2013 FEATURE FILM PRODUCTION REPORT 4-5 (2013).
34. Id. at 1 (The study is unique due to the methodology of focusing on global filming
locations of movies produced by U.S. Major and Mini-Major film production companies; studies
conducted by individual states such as Florida, Michigan, and Massachusetts, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, and South Carolina are focused on state specific economic statistics for film
production.).
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by six major film production studios and five independent film
production studios located in Southern California. 35 In the 2013 study,
notably, Canada had fifteen movie productions representing fourteen
percent of the films, equaling the number of those filmed in California. 36
The United Kingdom had twelve films representing fourteen percent of
all the films. 37 FilmL.A. has completed subsequent film studies for
2014 38 and 2015 39 using the same methodology. For those years, the
U.S. has remained the primary film production location with sixty-four
percent of films surveyed in 2014 and sixty-five percent of films
surveyed in 2015. 40 The table below summarizes the percentage shares
of the U.S. film industry held by Canada, the U.K., and Australia: 41
Table 3
Partial List by Country of Percentage Share of U.S. Film Industry
Production
Location
Canada
U.K.
Australia

D.

2013 (108
Films)
15%
12%
2%

2014 (106
Films)
12
15
3

2015 (109
Films)
11
15
1

Rise of State Tax Incentives Outside of California

In addition to foreign countries like Canada and the United
Kingdom competing with California, the 1990s saw a rising number of
states creating film-incentive programs to compete with California. In
1992, Louisiana was the first state outside of California to offer tax
35. Id. at 4 (“Majors” include Disney, Warner Brothers, NBCUniversal, Paramount, Sony
and 20th Century Fox; Independent studios known as “Mini Majors” include Dreamworks,
Lionsgate, Weinstein Co., FilmDistrict, and Relativity.).
36. Id. at 5.
37. Id.
38. ADRIAN MCDONALD, 2014 FEATURE FILM STUDY (2014) (The study methodology used
films produced by Major studios Disney, Warner Brothers, NBCUniversal, Paramount, Sony and
20th Century Fox and Independent studios Dreamworks, Lionsgate, Weinstein Co., Summit
Entertainment, and Relativity.).
39. ADRIAN MCDONALD, 2015 FEATURE FILM STUDY 5 (2015) (The study methodology
used films produced by Major studios Disney, Warner Brothers, NBCUniversal, Paramount, Sony
and 20th Century Fox and Independent studios Dreamworks, Lionsgate/Summit Entertainment,
Weinstein Co., CBS, and Blumhouse.) (The 2016 Feature Film Production Report is scheduled to be
finalized and published by May 2017.).
40. MCDONALD, supra note 38, at 2.
41. Id. at 3.
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incentives for film production. 42 Other states soon followed—Minnesota
in 1997, Missouri in 1999, and New Mexico in 2002. 43 North Carolina,
New York, South Carolina, and Florida would later develop incentive
programs that rivaled California’s. 44 The attached Appendix A lists the
current state film production incentive programs. 45 By 2013, New York,
Louisiana, Georgia, and Florida had larger film tax-credit programs than
California. 46 Louisiana, Georgia, and Florida did not “cap” or limit the
film tax-credit programs annually. New York’s film tax credit was
capped at $420 million.
Table 4
2013 State Film Tax Credit Programs
(Dollars in Millions)
State
New York
Louisiana
Georgia
Florida
California

Incentive
Percent
30-35
30-35
20-30
20-30
20-25

Annual
Cost
$420
$236
$140
$131
$100

In a FilmL.A., Inc. 2013 film study, Louisiana had overtaken
California as the leading state in the U.S. for film location production.
Of the 108 films surveyed, eighteen movies were primarily filmed in
Louisiana and fifteen were filmed in California. In addition, California’s
share of the top twenty-five highest grossing films decreased to twentyfour percent, down from sixty-eight percent fifteen years earlier. 47 By
2014, California had regained the position as the top state location from
Louisiana. Last year’s survey has California as the leading state location
for the second year in a row. The survey for 2013, 2014, and 2015 is
represented in the table below.

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

Luther, supra note 6, at 2.
Id.
Id.
See infra Appendix A.
TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 15, 18 (table adapted from figure).
Id. at 14.

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 50 [2017], Iss. 3, Art. 2

434

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[50:425

Table 5
Partial List Surveyed Films Produced by U.S. Film Industry by
State Location
Production
Location
California
Louisiana
Georgia
New York
Pennsylvania
Massachusetts
North Carolina
New Mexico
Michigan

2013
(108
Films
158
18
9
4
2
5
4
3
1

2014
(106
Films)
22
5
10
13
1
3
2
2
2

2015
(109
Films)
19
12
12
7
6
3
3
2
0

III. MEASUREMENT OF EFFECTIVENESS OF INCENTIVE PROGRAM
This section will analyze the effectiveness of tax-incentive
programs for the film industry. It will begin by explaining the economic
impact analysis, which is the primary method of measuring the
effectiveness of incentive programs. The section will then analyze the
pitfalls of measuring the effectiveness of these incentive programs, such
as the failure of the states to collect accurate data and the inability to
consistently measure job creation. Next the section will explore the
issues resulting from states’ “bidding” against one another with tax
incentives to win production contracts. Finally, the current trends in the
state tax-incentive film programs will examined.
A.

Economic Impact Analysis

The primary methodology to measure the effectiveness of incentive
programs is the economic impact analysis. 48 The analysis is a
quantitative technique that examines the change in economic activity as

48. THE COUNCIL FOR COMMUNITY AND ECONOMIC RESEARCH, 2012 STATE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES SURVEY REPORT (May 2013) at 27, http://members.c2er.org/
download/2012_Economic_Development_Program_Survey_Report.pdf (The survey includes state
tax and non-tax incentive for economic development.).
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the sum of direct effects, indirect effects, and induced effects.49 Direct
effects are initial changes in employment, income, and output of a
company. 50 The hiring of film production employees such as camera and
sound technicians is the direct effect of the film production company’s
expenditures. Indirect effects are changes in employment, income, and
output due to a company’s expenditures and purchases. 51 An example of
indirect effects is job creation of a business that supports the film
production, such as the hiring of restaurant workers serving film
production crews. Lastly, induced effects on the economy are the
increased wages of individuals in unrelated industries. 52 To measure the
total effect of the incentives on the economy of the state, economists use
a “multiplier” ratio to gauge the ripple effect of the initial company’s
increase to economic activity. 53 One of the most common software
programs used to model the “ripple effect” is the Regional Economic
Models Inc. (REMI). 54 In September 2014, the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue issued a report on the state’s film industry
incentives. 55 To illustrate the use of the REMI, the following diagram
was used by the Massachusetts Department of Revenue: 56
Wage and Non-Wage Spending Generated by the Tax Incentives
And
Economic Activity Generated by Spending (Positive “Multiplier”
Impact)

Minus
State Spending Cuts or Tax/Fee Increases Required to Maintain a
Balanced Budget (Negative Economic Impact)
And
Additional State Economic Impact of Those State Spending Cuts or
Tax/Fee Increases (Negative “Multiplier” Impact)

49. See Jonathan Q. Morgan, Analyzing the Benefits and Costs of Economic Development
Projects, U. N.C. SCH. GOV’T, Apr. 2010, at 2.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 4-5.
55. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, A REPORT ON THE
MASSACHUSETTS FILM INDUSTRY TAX INCENTIVES (2013).
56. Id. (adapted visual from page 5).
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The table below describes the types of statistical information needed to
do the economic impact analysis: 57
Table 6
The total amount of tax credits claimed and paid during the fiscal
year
Estimate of film production activity that would have occurred in the
state without tax incentives
Amount spent on wage and non-wage spending for film productions
that claimed the tax incentives
Amount spent on wages and salaries that were paid to state residents
and non-residents
Amount spent on non-wages paid to state based and out-of-state
businesses;
Net number of new jobs generated by film productions that claimed
the tax incentives, for both residents and non-residents
Net increase in spending that occurred in state as a result of the film
tax credits.
Types of productions claiming the tax credits

B.

Problems with Measuring Economic Impact of Programs
1. Failure of States to Collect Accurate Data

In the beginning of this Article, I asked if filming the movie
Divergent in Chicago produced the economic results promised by the
Illinois Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity’s Illinois
Film Office (IFO) of 1,000 jobs and a net economic result of $30
million. Without accurate data, there is no definitive answer—a problem
like the ones encountered in similar tax-incentive programs. According
to the IFO, the goal of the tax credit is “[t]o attract local vendors, union
leaders, and filmmakers to the Illinois film industry in order to promote
growth and job opportunities.” 58 The IFO program grants film
57. Adapted from COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, A
REPORT ON THE MASSACHUSETTS FILM INDUSTRY TAX INCENTIVES 5 (2013).
58. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,
https://www.illinois.gov/dceo/whyillinois/Film/FilmTaxCredit/Pages/default.aspx; see also 35 ILL.
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production companies a tax credit of thirty percent of qualified film
production spending incurred within a twelve-month period, and a thirty
percent credit on Illinois salaries of up to $100,000 per worker. 59 Only
salaries of workers who are residents of Illinois qualify for the credit.60
The IFO requires that the applicant receiving the tax credit “use its best
efforts to supply information disclosing the number of production type
jobs created and/or retained and whether the production type jobs were
entry, management or skilled labor.” 61 This “best efforts” standard
creates the problem of inaccurate data because the quality of the data is
subjective. The IFO does require applicants to use IFO-approved Illinois
CPA firms in verifying the production costs being claimed for the
receipt of the tax credit. 62 The use of the approved-CPA-firm
requirement is for the granting of the credit, not for verifying the results
of the film production—namely the number of jobs produced and
general economic benefit received by the state. The IFO is required to
report at the end of each fiscal quarter to the Illinois General Assembly
the economic impact of the tax-credit program, specifically including the
number of jobs created and retained. 63 Since the initiation of the Illinois
film tax-credit program in 2008, the IFO has only submitted one
quarterly report to the General Assembly, which is for the fourth quarter
of fiscal year 2016. 64 Based on the “best efforts” standard for
verification of the economic benefits and the failure of the IFO to submit
quarterly reports on the economic benefits of the tax credits, the claim of
1,000 jobs created and a net $30 million benefit cannot be substantiated.
The Illinois Policy Institute, an independent advocacy organization on
government efficiency, also disputes the economic benefits created by
the filming of the movie Divergent. 65 They point out that the 1,000 jobs
created were temporary and did not constitute full-time positions. 66

COMP. STAT. 16/5 (2008).
59. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 16/10 (2008) (film production commencement on or after January 1,
2009).
60. Id.
61. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 528.62 (2013).
62. See ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITY,
https://www.illinois.gov/dceo/whyillinois/Film/FilmTaxCredit/Pages/FAQs.aspx (Frequently Asked
Questions).
63. 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. 16/45 (2008); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 14, § 528.40 (2007).
64. ILLINOIS FILM PRODUCTION SERVICES TAX CREDIT QUARTERLY REPORT: FY2016 Q4
APRIL 1, 2016–JUNE 30, 2016 (2016).
65. Chris Andriesen, Spotlight on Spending #13: Illinois Film Tax Credit Program, ILLINOIS
POLICY INSTITUTE (September 22, 2010), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/reports/spotlight-onspending-13-%e2%80%aaillinois-film-tax-credit-program%e2%80%ac/.
66. Id.; see also Michael Lucci, Illinois’ record film revenue: What’s the cost?, ILLINOIS
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Illinois is not the only state with data accuracy issues. Marc
Taylor’s reports on tax credits, requested by the California Legislature,
suggest that collection of accurate data from film production is
difficult. 67 There is also the issue of whether economic growth is directly
due to film incentives. A recent Massachusetts report on film incentives
said a state must determine if economic development was due to the film
tax incentives or other unknown economic factors. 68
2. Measuring Job Creation
As stated in Table 5, employment and wage statistics are vital to
conducting the economic impact analysis. States receive this data from
employers that file quarterly employment and wage statistics. However,
the employment and wage information from film production may
include data from business generated, but not related to film production,
and thus be overstated. 69 For instance, the employment and wage data
from another industry such as television broadcasting might be included
in the information. 70 The data might be understated if the employer of
film production employees is considered the payroll company that
contracts with the film production company or if actors, screenwriters,
directors, and others work on a freelance basis and are not considered
employees of the film production companies. 71 Another problem with
the accuracy of the employment and wage information is the definition
of an “employee” as determined by the state. Some states treat
employees that work fewer than forty hours as a full-time equivalent
employee. 72 Other states include part-time employees in their statistics. 73
For instance, North Carolina allows counting of all people who work on
film projects, regardless of how long they are employed or the number
of hours they worked. 74 New Mexico uses the number of “worker days”
on a film by employees. 75 Pennsylvania uses a full-time equivalent
methodology. 76 The differences in counting methodologies make it
POLICY INSTITUTE (January 22, 2014), https://www.illinoispolicy.org/illinois-record-film-revenuewhats-the-cost/.
67. TAYLOR, supra note 9.
68. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, supra note 57, at 2.
69. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 7.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 5.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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nearly impossible to compare job growth state by state. Thus, some
states with more liberal definitions of the hours required in order to be
considered full-time, or states that include part-time employees, may
overstate employment created by the film production incentive.
C.

Other Problems Created by State Film Production Incentives

Competition among states to attract film production companies can
result in several states “bidding” for the same film production. What is
wrong with economic competition among states for film production?
Robert Tannenwald, Senior Fellow at the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, posits that no state wins in a subsidy war to attract film
production because they end up “paying” more in incentives than is
necessary to attract film production. 77 Some critics claim the
competition among states results in an economic war among competing
states where no state is a “winner” and there is a “zero-sum game.” 78
The Tax Foundation Report calls the competition for film production an
“arms race of incentives.” 79 On a national level, this competition does
not produce a net economic gain because capital is simply relocating
from one state to another. 80
It is also argued that the jobs created by film production are
typically temporary. 81 Once the film production has concluded the
“jobs” end. In addition, many of the jobs created are not high paying. 82
The average camera operators earn between $23,000 and $57,000 a year,
and film editors typically earn below $50,000 a year. 83 Moreover, most
of the skilled jobs go to out-of-state residents. 84 Thus, much of the
employment impact on the state benefits non-residents.
D.

Failed Programs

Several states have conducted impact studies to determine if their
film-industry tax incentives resulted in net economic gain. 85 The state of

77. ROBERT TANNENWALD, STATE FILM SUBSIDIES: NOT MUCH BANG FOR TOO MANY
BUCKS (2010) at 8.
78. Id.; see also Jonathan Q. Morgan, Using Economic Development Incentives: For Better
or for Worse, 74 POPULAR GOV’T 16, 16 (2009).
79. Luther, supra note 6, at 14.
80. Id. at 15.
81. TANNENWALD, supra note 77, at 7.
82. Id. at 1.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Id.
85. See examples of Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Pennsylvania and South Carolina
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Massachusetts conducted studies from 2006 through 2012.
Massachusetts is estimating a net loss of tax revenue due to its filmproduction tax credits of $54.6 million in 2013 and over $75 million in
2014. 86 The Los Angeles County Economic Development Corporation
(LAEDC) conducted studies to estimate the economic benefits of
California’s tax-credit program and determined the net economic
benefits in 2013 have been consistently overstated. 87
In addition to problems of net losses, some state film tax-incentive
programs have been marred by fraud and scandals. A film director was
found guilty of filing a false tax credit filing with the Massachusetts
Department of Revenue. 88 Fraud committed by Iowa’s film office chief
and six filmmakers led the Iowa state legislature to suspend the state’s
film tax-incentive program. 89
E.

Current Trends in State Film Incentive Programs

Uncertainty in state budgets and increasing pressure by taxpayer
advocacy groups have caused some states to reduce or eliminate their
film incentive programs. 90 Since 2009, ten states have effectively ended
their film incentive programs by repealing statutes or allowing sunset
provisions within statutes to effectuate. 91 In fiscal year 2016, Alaska,
Michigan, and New Jersey reduced their programs. 92 The Alaska
legislature moved up the sunset of its film tax-credit program from 2018
to 2016. 93 Michigan ended its film incentives beginning in fiscal year
2016. 94 In January 2016, New Jersey Governor Chris Christie vetoed the
state legislature’s bill that would have revived the state’s film tax-credit

studies.
86. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, A REPORT ON THE
MASSACHUSETTS FILM INDUSTRY TAX INCENTIVES (2014).
87. TAYLOR, supra note 9, at 23.
88. Robert W. Wood, Beware Film and Other Tax Shelter Deals, FORBES (June 5, 2012),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2012/06/05/beware-film-and-other-tax-shelter-deals-thatgo-criminal/#3f45dc7c533e.
89. Richard Verrier, Iowa film tax credit program racked by scandal, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/19/business/la-fi-ct-onlocation-20110119.
90. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
91. Id.
92. Id.; see also Elaine S. Povich, Some States Yell “Cut!” on Film Tax Credits, PEW
CHARITABLE TRUSTS (May 18, 2015), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/
stateline/2015/5/18/some-states-yell-cut-on-film-tax-credits.
93. Press Release, Governor Bill Walker, The State of Alaska, Governor Signs Bill Ending
Film Tax Credits (Jun. 16, 2015).
94. 2015 Mich. Pub. Acts 117.
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program, which had expired in July 2015. 95 North Carolina was another
state that allowed its film tax credit to expire on January 1, 2015. 96
Some states have placed limits on grants of film tax incentives. The
Louisiana legislature established a cap on film tax credits of $180
million for the next three years. 97 Other states, like Maryland,
maintained their programs. Maryland’s film production tax-credit
program was set to sunset on June 30, 2016. 98 However, Maryland
maintained the film tax credit and the cap of $7.5 million for fiscal year
2017 and for the foreseeable future. 99 Ironically, a September 2015
report of the Maryland Department of Legislative Services (DLS) did
not recommend extending the film production tax credit because it
determined that the credit did not create sustainable economic
development. 100 The DLS report found the state provided $62.5 million
in tax credits between fiscal years 2012 and 2016 while only receiving
approximately $3.8 million in net revenue. 101 Notwithstanding these
findings, the Maryland legislature agreed to extend the film tax credit at
its current level, but the amount of credit granted may not exceed the
amount of money appropriated to the reserve fund in the state budget. 102
The intent of extending the credit was to maintain the current level of
film production in the state, and to attract new film production activity to
the state. 103
Contrary to the trend to reduce or eliminate state film incentive
programs, at least three states have expanded their programs. Kentucky
lowered spending thresholds for qualified film production expenses from
$500,000 to $250,000 and increased its film tax credit from twenty
percent to thirty percent.104 The increases to Kentucky’s film incentive
program were proposed by state representative Rick Rand in House Bill
340, and were supported by the Kentucky Tourism Development
Finance Committee, Governor Steve Beshear, and first lady Jane
Beshear. 105 In testimony supporting the bill, first Lady Jane Beshear
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

N.J.S.A. 54:10A-5.39; P.L. 2005, c. 345; P.L. 2007, c. 257; P.L. 2010, c. 20.
See N.C. FILM OFF., https://www.filmnc.com/refundable-tax-credit.html.
L.A. R.S. 47:6007 C. (1)(d)(ii)(aa).
MD. CODE ANN., TAX-GEN. §10-730 (West 2015).
S. B. 905 (Md. 2015).
MD. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, EVALUATION OF THE MARYLAND FILM
PRODUCTION ACTIVITY CREDIT (2015) at vii-viii.
101. Id. at ix-x.
102. Id. at iv.
103. Id. (Two film productions mentioned in the DLS report were for the filming of the Home
Box Office series “Veep” and Netflix’s production of “House of Cards.”).
104. H. B. 340 (Ky. 2015).
105. Fiona Young-Brown, Kentucky Improves Film and TV Incentives - Newly Improved
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testified that Kentucky’s film incentive program had become less
desirable than those of thirty other states in attracting film production.106
Governor Beshear signed House Bill 340 into law May 7, 2015. 107 The
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania will increase the maximum available
tax credits from $60 million to $65 million, beginning in fiscal year
2017. 108 The increase does not meet the one-time maximum of the
program of $75 million, but demonstrates the state’s commitment to
compete for film production. 109 California made the most significant
increase. California increased its $100 million annual cap on film tax
credits to $230 million for fiscal year 2015-2016 and $330 million
through fiscal year 2019-2020. 110 California’s rationale for increasing its
incentives is not surprising. Since 2013, when Louisiana surpassed
California in film production, California legislators have consistently
sought legislative efforts to regain California’s dominance in film
production. By spring 2016, California had nine approved film
production projects estimated at $313 million in direct qualified in-state
spending. 111

Production Business Incentives Hold Promise to Boost State’s Film and TV Sector, THE LANE REP.
(June 10, 2015), http://www.lanereport.com/49980/2015/06/kentucky-improves-film-and-tvincentives/.
106. Id.; see Gov. Beshear signs Kentucky film incentives bill, WKYT (May 7, 2015),
http://www.wkyt.com/home/headlines/Gov-Beshear-signs-Kentucky-film-incentives-bill303014091.html (First Lady Beshear states “This legislation gives Kentucky-based filmmakers and
production companies a leg-up by offering incentives that help curb their film production costs . . . .
These incentives will help create a heightened interest for both local and outside filmmakers to seek
out Kentucky as a premier filming destination, and I look forward to the many new exciting projects
that will come about as a result of HB340.”).
107. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.0205 (West 2014). See Young-Brown, supra note 105
(Governor Beshear states “House Bill 340 gives Kentucky a strong advantage when competing with
other states for outside film projects . . . . Increased film production in Kentucky means a boost to
local economies and an opportunity to highlight the Bluegrass state on both big and small screens
across the world.”).
108. H. B. 1198, 2015 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2015); see also Tim Schooley,
Pennsylvania film tax credit to increase, PITTSBURGH BUSINESS TIMES (2016),
http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2016/07/14/pennsylvania-film-tax-credit-toincrease.html.
109. Schooley, supra note 108.
110. Assemb. B. No. 1839 (Ca. 2014); see also Dominic Patten, Hooray For Hollywood! Gov.
Brown Signs Film & TV Tax Credit Bill Extension, DEADLINE HOLLYWOOD (September 18, 2014),
http://deadline.com/2014/09/california-film-tv-tax-credit-bill-signed-jerry-brown-hollywood836075/.
111. Elyse Glickman, Tax Credits Inspire a Hollywood Homecoming, L.A. BUS. J. (March 9,
2016), http://labusinessjournal.com/news/2016/mar/09/tax-credits-inspire-hollywood-homecoming/.
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IV. PROPOSALS TO ASSIST STATES IN ACCOUNTING FOR PROGRAMS
States should consider their history of attracting film production in
determining whether film industry tax incentives are truly effective.
How realistic is it that the program will attract the film industry? Should
there be a limit on the amount of tax incentives granted, and what should
the limit be based on? Absent a particular geographic location within a
state, which would be hard to duplicate in a studio, some states should
not participate in a competition for film production. As previously
mentioned, some states have eliminated, reduced, or limited the granting
of film tax incentives. But, these proposals are meant to address issues
with current programs. This section makes three proposals. It first
emphasizes the importance of states’ collecting reliable data on the
economic impact of tax incentives, as well as the standardization
between states in their evaluation criteria. Second, it then proposes how
limits should be established and applied to the funding of film tax
incentives. Third, this section discusses the significance of the states in
requiring film production companies to provide accurate performance
data.
A.

Reliable Data on Film Tax Incentives and Standardization

States are using different standards regarding the type of data that
should be used to calculate the economic impact of state film tax
incentives. 112 These differences in standards distort the calculation of
effectiveness and allow states with lower standards to mask
inefficiencies of their programs. States must adopt standardized methods
to measure the expenditures of film production companies and jobs
created by their activities. An agreement among states for
standardization of definitions and measurement will also address the
current “bidding war” problem among states for film production. Adrian
McDonald proposed a national, rather than state-based, incentive
program to combat the bidding war and “race to the bottom” among
states offering film incentive programs, which would require federal
action and legislation. 113 His national film incentive would convert the
IRC § 181 deduction for film expenditures to a national tax credit and
would model existing state incentive programs such as California and

112. MCDONALD, supra note 39, at 19.
113. McDonald, supra note 5, at 158-162 (McDonald suggests a national incentive model to
combat the competition among the states based on California and New York’s existing incentive
programs).
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New York. 114 My proposal focuses on cooperation among the states
offering film incentives to accept standard definitions and measurements
to assist state economic development offices in evaluating data and
measuring the economic impact of their incentives. My standardization
proposal would be analogous to the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax
Agreement (SSUTA). 115 The SSUTA was created as a result of a
meeting of the National Governors’ Association, the National
Conference of State Legislatures, the Federation of Tax Administrators,
and the Multistate Tax Commission and was adopted by the original
nine member states on November 12, 2002. 116 The purpose of SSUTA is
to simplify the administration of sales use tax among states through
standardization. 117 As with the SSUTA, my proposal will standardize
key terms and definitions typically used by states in their film taxincentive programs such as qualified film production expenditures and
what constitutes a full-time equivalent job for purposes of measuring job
creation.
B.

Limits on Funding of Film Tax Incentives

To control potential net losses, states should fund film tax
incentives through state budget appropriations. Tax incentives would be
limited by the legislatively-approved state budget. State legislators
setting annual caps to the costs of funding film tax incentives would
limit their cost and help prevent net losses in tax revenue. Some states
have been forced to account for the amount of film tax incentives. For
example, Louisiana recently instituted an annual cap on its film tax
credits due to mounting pressure to account for economic benefits. 118 In
addition, Maryland extended its film tax credit for fiscal year 2017 and
beyond, but restricted the granting of the credit to money available in the
reserve fund of the state budget. 119 The key to successfully limiting film

114. Id. at 164-165.
115. See STREAMLINE SALES TAX, http://www.streamlinedsalestax.org/ (The Streamlined
Sales and Use Tax Agreement is an agreement among twenty-four member states to simplify the
administration of sales and use tax collection.).
116. John A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Stand for the
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 345-46 (2003) (The meeting was prompted among these
associations and entities to formulate solutions to the complex state sales tax systems that had
resulted from U.S. Supreme Court decisions, Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S.
753 (1967), and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), which held that a state cannot
require a retail seller that does not have physical presence in the state to collect sales and use tax.).
117. THE STREAMLINED SALES AND USE TAX AGREEMENT, § 102 (2016).
118. See Povich, supra note 92.
119. See MD. DEP’T OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, supra note 100.
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tax incentives to the amount appropriated in a balanced budget is to
encourage state legislators to regularly evaluate the fiscal impact of tax
incentives. 120 It is not enough to simply require state film incentive
offices to report economic benefits to the state legislature. State
legislatures must have enforcement powers to force regular reporting of
the economic impact of tax credit programs.
C.

Accountability of Businesses for Performance

To assist states in enforcing covenants, contractual conditions, and
promises of expenditure and job creation made by film production
companies, states should rigorously require specific performance.
Specific performance provisions should be incorporated in contractual
agreements with film production companies in the form of “claw-back”
or recapture provisions. States should also consider requiring film
production companies to post bonds to ensure that states may readily
recover for failure to meet covenants. Film production companies must
be accountable for their promise of economic activity or be forced to
repay the monetary value of tax incentives received. This issue, being
addressed by more states, is beginning to require oversight and
evaluation of existing film tax-incentive programs. 121 The number of
states requiring audit verification or substantiation from production
companies has risen from thirty-eight percent in 2014 to fifty-five
percent in 2016. 122 The trend of more states requiring accountability
from film production companies is a positive step to resolving this
problem, but also indicates the woeful percentage of states that do not
have accountability within their programs.
V. CONCLUSION
State tax incentives for the film industry will remain part of the
economic development program of many states despite recent troubled
programs and calls by public advocacy groups to reign in or eliminate
such programs. Some states have reduced or eliminated their film
industry incentive programs, but accountability remains an issue for the
forty-five percent of states with film incentive programs that do not
require audit verification or substantiation of the benefits gained from
the programs. The U.S. film industry continues to grow and there is
120. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, TAX INCENTIVE PROGRAMS-EVALUATE TODAY IMPROVE
TOMORROW 8 (2015).
121. NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 1.
122. Id.
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opportunity for states with well-developed programs and rigorous
compliance standards to be successful—providing net economic growth
from the granting of tax incentives to retain or attract film production.
To truly account for economic growth from these programs, states must
adopt standardized methods to measure the expenditures of film
production companies and jobs created by their activities. If all states
with these programs adopt these standards, state legislatures and the
public will be able to more easily determine the success of such
programs. These standards will also help create more reliable and
accurate data to measure the success of a program. Linking the funding
of these programs to a state’s budget process and limiting the
appropriation of the funds for the programs to an annual basis will also
help in managing the amount of incentives granted. Finally, states must
be proactive in enforcing the covenants and promises made by film
production companies and be willing to institute legal action to retrieve
lost funds due to the failure to meet such covenants. For these proposals
to be truly effective, all states granting tax incentives for the film
industry must be willing to accept the standardized definitions and
measurements. If only a few states agree to such provisions, they will be
at a disadvantage as compared to other states who continue the “race to
the bottom” to attract film production to their state. Adoption of these
proposals will help prevent future “fleecing” of state economies.
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Appendix A
State

Tax Credit and Incentive

Statute

Program
Alabama

25% rebate on qualified

Code of Ala. § 41-7A-43

expenditures; on state sales,
use, and lodgings taxes.
Alaska

Repealed Effective July 1,
2015

Arizona

No film incentive program.
Program discontinued in

A.R.S. § 41-1517 (repealed)
2012 Ariz. ALS 170

2015
Arkansas

Tax credit of 30% qualified
costs

California

20% to 25% tax credit at
maximum of $100 million

Colorado

Tax credit of 20% qualified
costs

Connecticut

10%, 15%, and 30% tax credit

A.C.A. § 15-4-2703
A.C.A. § 15-4-2705
A.C.A. § 15-4-2706
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §
17053.85
Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code §
23685
2011 Bill Tracking CA A.B.
2026
C.R.S.
24-48.5-311
(repealed)
2012 Colo. ALS 186
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 12-217jj

based on level of qualified
spending
Delaware

No film incentive program

District of Columbia

No film incentive program

Florida

Entertainment industry
financial incentive tax credit

73A-3.001, F.A.C.
Fla. Stat. § 288.1254

program; tax credits and cash
rebate
Georgia

activities on

O.C.G.A. § 48-7-40.26
Ga. Comp. R. & Regs. r.
560-7-8-.45
2011 Bill Text GA H.B. 386

20% to 25% refundable tax

HRS § 235-17

20% tax credit on qualified
investment in state; 10% tax
credit qualified production

Hawaii

credit
Idaho
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$100,000 per worker

2007 ILL. ALS 720
2007 Bill Text IL H.B. 2482
35 ILCS 5/213
35 ILCS 16/1 et seq.

Indiana

No film incentive program.

Burns Ind. Code Ann. § 6-3.1-32-9

Iowa

Repealed effective May 25,

Illinois

30% of the qualified Illinois
Production Spending and 30%
on Illinois salaries up to

2012
Kansas

No film incentive program

K.S.A. § 79-32,258

Kentucky

20% refundable tax credit for

KRS § 141.383
KRS § 148.544

qualifying production and postproduction related
expenditures, payroll with a
minimum in-state spend of
$500,000.
Louisiana

Repealed in 2016.

Maine

5% non-refundable tax credit
on non-wage expenses; rebate

5 M.R.S. § 13090-L
36 M.R.S. § 5219-Y

and reimbursement on certain
qualified expenditures
Maryland

Up to 25% refundable credit

Md. TAX-GENERAL Code
Ann.
§ 10-730
2013 Bill Text MD S.B. 183

Massachusetts

25% production credit, payroll

ALM GL ch. 62, § 6
2007 Mass. ALS 63

credit and sales tax exemption
Michigan

Partial reimbursement of
qualifying expenses

Minnesota

MCLS § 206.680
MCLS § 208.1107 (repealed)
MCLS § 208.1455 (repealed)
MCLS § 208.1457 (repealed)
MCLS § 208.1459 (repealed

20-25% reimbursement of
qualified expenses

Mississippi

25% rebate on investment;
30% on resident payroll; 25%

Miss. Code Ann. § 57-89-7
Rule 35.X.09

on non-resident payroll
Missouri

No film incentive program

Montana

Repealed effective January 1,
2015

Nebraska
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Beginning Jan. 1, 2014
transferable tax credit of 1519%

New Hampshire

No film incentive program

New Jersey

20% refundable tax credit on

N.J. Stat. § 54:10A-5.39

qualified expenditures - See if
Program is suspended
New Mexico

25% tax rebate (credit) on

N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-2F-1

qualifying expenses
New York

30% refundable tax credit

North Carolina

25% refundable tax credit

North Dakota

No film incentive program

Ohio

Refundable tax credit that

NY CLS Tax § 24
NY CLS Tax § 28
NY CLS Tax § 33
NY CLS Tax § 34
NY CLS Tax § 210
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-129.56
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 105-130.47
ORC Ann. 122.85

equals 25% off in-state and
non-resident wages, and 35%
in Ohio resident wages on
eligible productions
Oklahoma

Repealed effective January 1,
2014

Oregon

20% cash rebate on qualifying

ORS § 315.514

expenses; sales and use and
lodging tax exemption
expenditures

72 P.S. § 8702-D
72 P.S. § 8712-D – 8719-D

Rhode Island

25% transferable tax credit

R.I. Gen. Laws § 44-31.2-1

South Carolina

25% cash rebate on wages;

S.C. Code Ann. § 12-6-3570

Pennsylvania

25% tax credit on qualified

sales tax exemption up to
$250,000
South Dakota

No film incentive program

Tennessee

25% cash rebate; refund of
hotel occupancy and sales tax

Texas

Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-42109
H.B. 3839, Laws 2012

5-20% cash payment for
qualified expenses

Utah

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2017

Cash rebate of 20-25%

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-614.5
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Vermont

[50:425

Hotel tax exemption, sales and
use tax exemption

Virginia

15% tax credit for qualifying

Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-439.12:03

expenses including wages
Washington

Funding assistance up to 30%
qualified expenditures

West Virginia

Up to 31 % transferable tax

W. Va. Code § 11-13X-3

credit
Wisconsin

No film incentive program

Wyoming

15% cash rebate

123

123. Adapted from Lexis Multistate Tax Charts with Analysis; Corporate Income Tax Credits;
and chart from National Conference of State Legislatures, State Film Production Incentives &
Programs (March 28, 2014).
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